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The Dynamic Analyses of the Regional Differences
in Japanese Public Long-Term Care Insurance System
HE DU and HIROSHI FUTAMURA
1．Introduction
　The objective of this research is to analyze the dynamic properties of regional differences in the public 
long-term care insurance system. The system started in April 2000 to replace public old age welfare 
system with public insurance system. Since then, along with the aging Japanese demographic structure, 
the number of insured individuals, the number of care service users, and the cost have been increasing 
rapidly. The care service users pay 10% user fee. The remaining service cost is financed by insurance 
premium paid by covered individuals (50%) and by local and national public fund (50%). There are wide 
differences in regional figures with respect to the long-term care insurance system because it is managed 
by municipalities as insurers. The system is reviewed at every 5 years for major reform. The first major 
reform took place in 2005. At the time, Japanese government recognized the rapid increase in cost and 
the wide differences in regional figures. In fact, The Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (henceforth 
MHLW) stated in the 2005 report that biased regional distribution of service facilities and lax discipline on 
municipal management (especially on the review process of requests for certification) need to be corrected 
because these are the causes that will boost the national cost of long-term care services through widening 
regional differences. So the government took several measures to put brakes on the increasing cost and to 
remedy the regional differences to ease the pressure on local and national fiscal management. In Japan, it 
is expected that the public expenses that are related to services to elderly people such as pension, medical 
services, and long-term care services, will increase rapidly because of the aging demographic structure. The 
trend will add a further pressure on the fiscal management of Japanese government whose fiscal condition 
is already devastated through the long recession years in the 1990s and 2000s. Therefore, it is important to 
predict the future trend of the regional differences in public long-term care insurance system to measure the 
fiscal impact on those who have concerns in the system.
　In this research, we analyzed the dynamic properties of the regional differences in user rates defined as 
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the ratio of long-term care service users relative to insured individuals. The main findings are summarized 
as follows.
（ⅰ）A simple theoretical model predicts that each region's user rate converges to a unique globally stable 
steady state. The convergence, however, could be conditional, i. e., each region's user rate may converge to 
a region-specific steady state which is determined by the region's parameters.
（ⅱ）We calculated the user rates of 47 Japanese regions (prefectures) for the fiscal years between 2000 
and 2012. (Data source: The Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare.) Then, we divided the 47 
regions into 5 groups according to the standing order (high and low) of user rates. It turned out that the user 
rate of a group with higher (lower) user rate grows slower (faster). Hence, the regional user rates seem to 
exhibit a tendency to converge. The convergence, however, may be conditional. It turned out as well that 
the standing order of regional user rates is not quite variable.
（ⅲ）By using average Markov transition matrixes for the first half (2000-2005) and for the second half 
(2006-2012), we calculated the index of standing order mobility so as to evaluate the effects of the 2005 
reform which aimed to remedy the differences in regional figures of public long-term care insurance 
system. It turned out that the degree of mobility is greater in the first half than the second half for the group 
of regions with higher user rates. The 2005 reform, hence, did not seem to alleviate the standing order 
inertia.
（ⅳ）The small degree of variation in the standing order suggests the existence of region-specific factors. 
With the help of preceding researches, we chose 3 factors {the certification rate, the late-stage (75 years 
or older) old age ratio, and the ordinary balance rate} to account for the regional differences in user rates, 
and recalculated the mobility index by using the residuals. It turned out that the degree of mobility is 
improved for all the 5 groups and for both before and after the 2005 reform. Thus, the convergence might 
have been conditional. If region-specific factors were not removed, each region's user rate would converge 
to region-specific steady state, and the standing order of regional user rate would be invariant. It turned out 
as well that the 2005 reform hardly affected the standing order mobility of residual user rates. In addition, 
the analysis also revealed that the improvement in the standing order variation seems small even after the 
regional factors are removed. Therefore, there might be factors other than our choice that could explain the 
regional differences.
　This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly review the structure of the public long-
term care insurance system; The objective of the system, how an insured individual applies for care 
service provision, the statistical figures to grasp the trend and the current status of the system, preceding 
researches, and the implication of the 2005 reform. In the research, we look at the dynamic behavior of 
the “user rate” defined as the number of those who use the long-term care services relative to the primary-
insured individuals (65 years or older). By using the MHLW data, we calculated long-term care service 
user rates of 47 regions (prefectures) from 2000 to 2012 fiscal years. We paid attention on the comparisons 
between the dynamic behavior before (2000-2005) and after (2006-2012) the 2005 reform. The data show 
the following properties. The national average user rate increased between 2000 and 2005 at a diminishing 
growth rate and ceased to grow. After 2006, it began to grow again, at a diminishing growth rate. The 
Gini coefficient of regional user rates decreased between 2000 and 2012. Although the coefficient of 
variation did not show clear trend, the ratio of maximum value to the minimum value also decreased. These 
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properties suggest that the regional user rates may be converging. The 2005 reform may have affected the 
regional user rates, but not quite the intended way. The MHLW suggested in 2005 report that the regional 
differences in the long-term care insurance system figures might be caused by structural region-specific 
reasons. Hence, even if the regional user rates converge, the standing order of regional user rates, from 
the highest to the lowest, will not be variable, i.e., the regions with high user rate will not exchange their 
positions with the regions with low user rate in the standing order. In addition, the observations suggest 
that the convergence in regional user rates may be conditional on region-specific characteristics, i.e., each 
region's user rate is converging to region-specific steady state. To investigate if the 2005 reform had any 
effect on the standing order of regional user rates, we divided 47 regions into 5 groups according to the 
value of each region's user rate, from the highest to the lowest, and looked at the dynamic properties of 
each group's user rate. It turned out that the user rate of the highest (lowest) group grows slower (faster). 
Therefore, the regional user rates may be converging. It is not clear, however, if they are converging to 
the same steady state. In addition, the standing order of each region's user rate is quite immobile, before 
and after the 2005 reform. These observations suggest that the convergence may be conditional on region-
specific elements, and the 2005 reform did not seem to make the standing order more mobile. In section 3, 
we construct a simple theoretical model of the Japanese long-term care insurance system. Then the model is 
analyzed to derive dynamic properties of the system. It will be shown that each region's user rate converges 
to a unique and globally stable steady state. If regions have different parameter values, however, then each 
region converges to region-specific steady state (conditional convergence). Furthermore, it will be shown 
that the theoretical model can replicate the motion of regional user rates observed in actual statistical data. 
In section 4, we construct average Markov transition matrixes to analyze each region's mobility across the 
standing order of regional user rates. We also evaluate if the 2005 reform made the standing order more 
variable because it tried to remedy regional differences in user rates. It will be shown that the 2005 reform 
seems to have had little effect on improving the regional mobility. In fact, the regions with higher user 
rate became less mobile after 2005. The analysis in section 4 suggests that the regional mobility might be 
dependent on region-specific elements. Therefore, in section 5, we try to remove region-specific elements 
(the rate of care need certification by municipalities, the late-stage (75 years or older) old age population 
rate, and the regional ordinary balance rate) from each region's user rate, and reevaluated the effects of 
2005 reform on the regional mobility. It turned out that the regional mobility is improved by removing 
the region-specific elements, suggesting that the convergence is conditional. However, we were not able 
to confirm if the 2005 reform had any effect on improving the regional mobility. In addition, the analysis 
also suggests that there are region-specific elements, other than the ones used in our research, yet to be 
discovered that account for the regional mobility. We note the remaining issues in section 6.
　There are preceding researches on the dynamic properties of public long-term care insurance system. 
Some of them sought elements that affect the variables of interest, such as the service cost, the number 
of service users, and the insurance premium, so as to predict the future trends of these variables. Others 
employed panel data to seek elements that explain the time and cross-sectional variations in these variables. 
[Suzuki(2002), Shimizutani and Noguchi (2004),Kikuchi, Tajika, and Yui (2005), and Kikuchi (2008) 
calculated the future trends of the long-term care insurance system. Tajika and Kikuchi (2003), Shimizutani 
and Inakura(2006), Ando (2008), and the annual reports by the MHLW (2005, 2007) analyzed the causes 
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of regional differences in the system.] There are not many researches, however, that take the long-term 
care insurance system as a system of dynamical equations, as we do in this research, so as to seek the 
proof of convergence (or non-convergence thereof), and to analyze the degree of mobility in the standing 
order of regional user rates. The analytical tools employed in this research are widely used in the field 
of endogenous economic growth theory. These tools are useful and powerful for analyzing the dynamic 
properties of time and cross-sectional differences in socio-economic system. For the concept and analytical 
methods of the convergence and the conditional convergence, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). For the 
application of Markov transition matrix analysis, see Quah (1993).
2．The Public Long-Term Care Insurance System in Japan; A Quick Review.
　In this section, we will make a quick review on the public long-term care insurance system; The 
objective of the system, how a covered individual applies for and receives care services, the statistical 
figures of the system, preceding researches, and the objective of the 2005 reform.
2. 1　The Objective of the Public Long-Term Care Insurance System
　The public long-term care insurance system started on April 2000. Before that, in traditional Japan, the 
cares for elderly people were thought to be done by family members, especially by wives. Such tradition 
became unsustainable because of rapidly aging demographic structure and increasing nuclear families. The 
increase in those who need long-term care relative to those who provide put physical and psychological 
pressures on many families. On the other hand, medical resources were used up by those who were not 
ill or sick but without enough care by family members. (The hospitalization by sociological reasons. 
According to the OECD health statistics, the average length of stay of Japanese inpatients is 31.2 days 
(2012), while the numbers are 10.1 days in France (2012), 9.2 days in Germany (2012), 7.2 days in the 
United Kingdom (2012), and 6.1 days in the United States (2011).) It became inevitable that the long-term 
care services for elderly people go public.
　The new system replaced public welfare system for elderly people with public insurance system in 
which municipalities take role as managers. Those who contribute to the insurance system are the primary 
individuals (65 years or older) and the secondary insured individuals (40-64 years old). The national 
average monthly insurance premium paid by a primary insured individual is ¥4972 in 2014 fiscal year. The 
insurance premium of the secondary insured individuals is collected as part of payroll tax. For example, 
in 2013 fy, it is 1.55% of the salary of those covered by the health insurance association for medium-small 
firms. The main beneficiaries are the primary insured individuals. The secondary insured individuals also 
receive benefits, but in limited cases. In 2014 fy, the total cost for the long-term care services was ¥10 
trillion. The service users paid 10% user fee. (The fee varies with user's income level.) After subtracting 
¥0.7 trillion user fee, the remaining ¥9.3 trillion are financed by the insurance premium contributions and 
the public (national and local) disbursement shared at 50:50.
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2. 2　Application Process for the Long-Term Care Services
　For a primary insured individual, the application process for care services consists of the following 3 
steps.
Step 1: When a primary insured individual finds herself in need for long-term care services, she applies for 
the certification of long-term care need by her municipality (insurer).
Step 2: The municipality, aided by committee members, decides if it grants the certification to the applicant. 
(Depending on the necessity, from light to the most serious, there are 7 levels of the certification.)
Step 3: If granted, the primary insured individual, aided by “care managers” about care plans, receives 
services where the recipient pays 10% user fee. The long-term care services are provided by private 
sector business entities subject to public supervision. There are in-home services, facility services, and 
community-based services.
2. 3　The Figures of the Public Long-Term Care Insurance System
　As stated in the introduction, along with rapidly aging demographic structure, the figures related to the 
public long-term care insurance system have been increasing too. The followings are some figures reported 
by the MHLW to grasp the magnitude.
*Total cost: ¥3.6 trillion (2000 fiscal year) ߛ ¥10.0 trillion (2014 fiscal year) (+170%）
*The number of individuals certified by municipalities for long-term care need: 2.18 million (2000 fy) ߛ 
5.64 million (2013 fy) (+159%)
*The number of service users: 1.49 million (2000 fy) ߛ 4.71 million (2013 fy) (+216%)
*The national average monthly insurance premium of primary insured individual: ¥2911 (2000 fy) ߛ ¥4972 
(2014 fy) (+71%)
　Because the system is managed by municipalities, there are regional differences in the figures. For 
example, the monthly insurance premium at the municipal level for the 6th planning period (2015-2017 fy), 
the highest number is ¥8686 (Tenkawa village of Nara prefecture) which is 3.1 times higher than the lowest 
¥2800 (Mishima village of Kagoshima prefecture). At the prefecture level, the highest is ¥5880 of Okinawa 
which is 1.3 times higher than the lowest ¥4409 of Tochigi.
2. 4　The Causes of Regional Differences and the 2005 Reform
　Many researches addressed the causes of the differences in the regional figures of public long-term care 
insurance system. Suzuki (2002) reported that a region with higher certification rate and the faster growth 
in those who need long-term care tends to have the faster growth in in-home service cost. The MHLW 
stated in 2007 annual report that faster increase in those who request for light support and care and faster 
increase in those who use in-home services cause faster increase in municipal certifications and care service 
users. Tajika and Kikuchi (2006) suggested that lax discipline on municipal management, incomplete task 
division between medical services and care services, and ineffectiveness of care services on rehabilitating 
users may explain the speed of increase in long-term care services. Ando (2008) found that regions with 
more low income individuals and more late-stage (75 years or older) old individuals have higher long-term 
care service cost. Tajika and Kikuchi (2003), the MHLW annual report (2005), and Abrai (2006) found that 
a region with more facilities tends to have higher cost because it induces more demand for facility services 
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(which cost more relative to in-house services). These researches suggest the importance of {shift from 
facility to in-home services, rigorous discipline on municipal management, prevention against long-term 
care need}.
　In accordance with the implications of these researches, Japanese government took the following 
measures to remedy the regional differences in the 2005 reform.
*Tighter municipal discipline on the review process for certification.
*Less biased distribution of facilities across regions by limiting the total number.
*Induce private business entities to supply relatively more in-home services to those users with medium-
serious conditions.
*Facility service users are made to pay residence and meal cost.
*Introduce community-based services that aim to prevent elderly people from being in need for long-term 
care.
　In the following sections, we will analyze the dynamic properties of regional differences in long-term 
care insurance system and the effect of the 2005 reform.
3．Theoretical Model Analyses of the Public Long-Term Care Insurance System
　As we saw in the previous section, there are wide differences in regional figures of the public long-term 
care insurance system. It is important to predict the future trend of the system because it helps those who 
have concerns in the system. For example, the prediction will help municipalities as insurers to evaluate 
the fiscal impact of the system, which consequently will affect insured individuals. For this purpose, 
we construct a theoretical model of the public long-term care insurance system and analyze dynamical 
properties of “user rate” which is defined as the ratio of service users among insured individuals. The 
theoretical model will be used to derive a convergence hypothesis with respect to regional user rates.
3. 1　Theoretical Model Analyses
　The Japanese public long-term care insurance system will be modeled as follows. There are I = 47 
regions (prefectures). For {i = 1, 2, ... , I, t = 0, 1, 2, ... }, let Li, t be the number of primary insured 
individuals (65 years or older) of region i in period t. In the following, the region subscript “i“ will be 
omitted unless necessary. Let n be the gross rate of change in the number of primary insured individuals, 
reflecting the number of those who were 64 years old in the previous period and the number of those who 
moved from other regions. Let į be the “depreciation” rate of primary insured individuals, reflecting the 
number of deceased and the number of those who moved to other regions. Then, the net growth of the 
number of primary insured individuals is expressed as follows.
　　
1 0 1 2
 （3.1）
Suppose the public long-term care insurance system is introduced at the beginning of period zero. Let X0 be 
the number of service users. Under the current system, X0 is determined through the following 4 steps. (See 
section 2. 2.)
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Step 1: Let p be the probability that an insured individual find herself in need for long-term care services 
(need for care rate). Then at t = 0, among the primary insured individuals L0, p×L0 is the number of 
individuals who find themselves in need for long-term care services. (1 í p)×L0 is the number of 
individuals who do not.
Step 2: Let q be the probability of applying for municipal certification for long-term care need by an 
individual in step 1 (application rate). Then, q×p×L0 is the number of individuals applying for the 
municipal certifications. (1 í q)×p×L0 is the number of individuals not applying.
Step 3: Let r be the probability that a municipality as insurer grants certification to an applicant in step 3. 
Then, r×q×p×L0 is the number of individuals who are granted municipal certifications (certification 
rate). (1 í r)×q×p×L0 is the number of individuals who are not granted.
Step 4: Let s be the probability that an individual with municipal certification use public long-term care 
service (net user rate). Then s×r×q×p×L0 is the number of those who use services. (1 í s)×r×q×p×
L0 is the number of those who do not.
　As a result of step 1 - step 4, in a region at t = 0, the number of individuals who use public long-term 
care services is
　　  （3.2）
The rest L0 í X0 = (1 í p) L0 + (1 í q) pL0 + (1 í r) qpL0 + (1 í s) rqpL0 is the number of individuals who 
do not use public long-term care service. Instead, they will choose from such alternatives as private care 
services, public or private medical services, no services at all and stay as they are, etc. Figure 3.1 depicts 
the flow process that determines X0.
Figure 3.1　Application Process for the Long-Term Care Services
　In the next period t = 1, the number of service users X1 is calculated as follows. The number of primary 
insured individuals in L1 is decomposed as follows.
　　 1 1 1
 （3.3）
In (3.3), nL0 is the number of new primary insured individuals, (1 í į)(X0 í L0) is the survivors among 
non-users, and (1 í į) X0 is the survivors among service users. The logic used to derive X0 in t = 0 is also 
applicable to derive X1 as follows. Among the new primary insured individuals, pqrs×nL0 individuals use 
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services in t = 1. Among the surviving non users, pqrs×(1 í į)(X0 í L0) individuals use services in t = 1. 
Therefore, the number of service users X1 is calculated as follows.
　　
1
1 1
1
 （3.4）
Equation (3.1) is used to derive the last line. (In the derivation of (3.4), we assumed that once an individual 
begins to use long-term care services, the individual keeps using the services in subsequent years. This 
assumption reflects the observation by Tajika and Kikuchi (2006) about the inability of public long-term 
care services to rehabilitate individuals under care. If insured individuals go back and forth between “under 
care” state and “out of care (rehabilitated)” state, then the dynamical analyses will be much more complex, 
and beyond the scope of this research.) Equation (3.4) holds in any year t = 0, 1, 2, ... . Define the user rate 
xt by
　　  （3.5）
By dividing both sides of equation (3.4) by Lt, we have the following linear first-order difference equation 
with respect to user rate xt.
　　
1 1
1
 （3.6）
Equation (3.1) is used again to derive (3.6). If {p, q, r, s, n, į} are constant parameters, then in (3.6), the 
slope is 0＜ (1 í į)(1 í pqrs)/(1 + n í į)＜1. Therefore, the dynamical system (3.6) is globally stable. That 
is, for any x0＞0, the sequence of user rate {xt; t = 0, 1, 2, ... } monotonically converges to a unique steady 
state x* where
　　 1 1 1 1
 （3.7）
In addition, it can be shown that, for any two regions i and j,
　　 0 1 2
 
（3.8）
These observations imply that the regional user rates {xi, t; i = 1, 2, ... , I, t =  0, 1, 2, ... } exhibit 
“convergence” to the same steady state x* if all the regions have the same values of parameters {p, q, r, s, n, 
į}.
　The values of parameters, however, may be different across regions. For example, the MHLW 2005 
annual report documented the regional differences in municipal certification rate r. We also expect that the 
parameter values are region-specific because of various socio-economic reasons. If the parameter values in 
equation (3.6) are different across regions, then each region's user rate xi, t may converge to region-specific 
steady state xi*. That is, the user rate convergence is conditional on each region's parameter values. In the 
next section, we analyze the data of regional user rates to investigate the following two hypotheses;
[(Unconditional) Convergence Hypotheses] All the regional user rates {xi, t; i = 1, 2, ... , I, t = 0, 1, 2, ... } 
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converges to the same steady state x*.
[Conditional Convergence Hypotheses] Each regional user rates {xi, t; i = 1, 2, ... , I, t = 0, 1, 2, ... } 
converges to the region-specific steady state xi*.
　We add some comments on the dynamic properties of equation (3.6). The government reviews the long-
term care insurance system and conduct major reforms at every five years. For example, the 2005 reform 
may have affected the dynamical system (3.6) as follows.
（ⅰ）The 2005 reform made the facility service users pay residence and meal cost. This change might 
have depressed the demand for long-term care services, and hence lowered the net user rate s.
（ⅱ）The 2005 reform enhanced the efforts of preventing insured individuals from being in need for long-
term care services. The prevention efforts might have lowered the need for care rate p.
（ⅲ）The 2005 reform imposed more rigorous discipline on the review process for certification by 
municipalities. This might have lowered the certification rate r.
（ⅳ）As the number of service users increases, the public long-term care insurance system may gain 
wider societal recognition. As a result, those who previously regarded the public long-term care services 
as public welfare with some stigma will be less reluctant to apply for the services. The prevalence of the 
system, hence, may increase the application rate q. (The traditional view about long-term care for elderly 
people may change as service users increase and as people learn more about the system. In this case, the 
application rate q in equation (3.6) may not be a constant parameter, but dependent on user rate xt. If it is 
so, then equation (3.6) is no longer a linear equation. Instead, equation (3.6) may generate a complex path 
for the use rate sequence {xt; t = 0, 1, 2, ... }.
（ⅴ）The differences in long-term care insurance system across municipalities may induce each insured 
individual to seek a region with better services and lower cost. This may affect each region's net growth 
rate n í į of insured individuals.
　By differentiating the steady state user rate x* (equation (3.7)) with respect to the parameters {p, q, r, s, n, 
į}, we verify the following comparative static properties.
　　  （3.9）
In (3.9), the “+” or “í” sign above each parameter indicates the effect of an increase in the parameter value 
on the steady state user rate x*. An increase in the need for care rate p, an increase in the application rate 
q, an increase in the certification rate r, or an increase in the net user rate s obviously causes the steady 
state user rate x* to increase. Although the net growth rate of primary insured individuals is expressed as 
n í į, an increase in the gross growth rate n or an increase in the depreciation rate į causes x* to decrease 
because of the following reasons. An increase in the gross growth rate n causes the steady state value of the 
user rate xt = Xt /Lt to decrease simply because of the faster increase in denominator Lt. On the other hand, 
the increase in the depreciation rate į has two effects on the steady state user rate x*. While it causes the 
number of primary insured individuals to decrease, it also causes the number of surviving service users to 
decrease. The latter effect dominates the former because the latter works at the cumulative stock level while 
the former at the flow level.
　Figure 3.2 is a phase diagram of equation (3.6). The horizontal axis measures xt and the vertical axis 
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measures xt + 1. If the parameters {p, q, r, s, n, į} are constant, then the graph of (3.6) is depicted as an 
upward-sloping straight line with intercept pqrs at the vertical axis. Because the slope is 0＜(1 í į)(1 
í pqrs)/(1 + n í į)＜1, the dynamical system (3.6) has a unique and globally stable steady state at the 
intersection of the graph of (3.6) and 45-degree line in figure 3.2. That is, given any initial user rate x0＞
0, the sequence of user rate {xt; t = 0, 1, 2, ... } generated by equation (3.6) monotonically converges to the 
steady state user rate x*. Furthermore, if the initial user rate xi, 0 of region i is smaller than xj, 0 of region j, 
then the growth rate of region i's user rate is larger than that of region j for all the subsequent periods, i.e.,
　　 0 1 2  （3.10）
Figure 3.2　Phase Diagram of Equation (3.6)
　The effects of changes in the value of parameters {p, q, r, s, n, į} on the steady state user rate x* can 
be analyzed by using figure 3.2. In the figure, an increase in the need for care rate p, an increase in the 
application rate q, an increase in the certification rate r, or an increase in the net user rate s causes the 
vertical intercept pqrs to increase and the slope (1 í į)(1 í pqrs)/(1 + n í į) to decrease. The combined 
effect is a rise in the intersection of the graph of (3.6) and 45-degree line, i.e., an increase in the steady 
state user rate x*. An increase in the gross growth rate n or an increase in the depreciation rate į does not 
affect the vertical intercept pqrs. However, it causes the slope (1 í į)(1 í pqrs)/(1 + n í į) to decrease. As 
a result, the intersection of the graph of (3.6) and 45-degree line decreases, i.e., the steady state user rate x* 
decreases. These statements are also verified by simple calculus. For example, [(1 í į)(1 í pqrs)/(1 + n í 
į)]/į =  í (1 í pqrs)n/(1 + n í į)2＜0 provided n＞0.
Table 3.1 summarizes the effects of the 2005 reform on the steady state user rate x*. The table suggests that 
the 2005 reform tried to stabilize the fiscal management of public long-term care insurance system against 
rapid increase in service users and service cost.
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3. 2　Numerical Example
　Panel A of figure 3.3 depicts transitional paths of two regions, a and b, such that the initial user rate 
of region a, x(a, 0), is smaller than that of region b, x(b, 0). In addition, we assume that both of them are 
smaller than the steady state user rate x*, i.e., x(a, 0)＜x(b, 0)＜x*. The parameter values are same for 
both regions, set at {p = 0.25, q = 0.8, r = 0.15, s = 0.8, n = 0.1, į = 0.05}. Given these values, equation 
(3.7) implies the steady state user rate x* = 0.2052. The initial user rates are set at x(a, 0) = 0.1 and x(b, 0) 
= 0.15. Panel B of figure 3.3 depicts the growth rates of two regions {[(x(a, t + 1) í x(a, t))/x(a, t)], [(x(b, t 
+ 1) í x(b, t))/x(b, t)]; t = 0, 1, 2, ... }. These figures show that the transitional paths of user rates generated 
by the dynamical system (3.6) monotonically converge to the steady state, and the growth rate of user rate 
is higher (lower) for the region with lower (higher) initial user rate.
Table 3.1　The Effects of the 2005 Reform on the Steady State User Rate x*
Enhanced Senility Prevention Effort p↓ ⇒ x*↓
Charging Residence and Meal Cost s↓ ⇒ x*↓
Tightening Discipline on Municipalities r↓ ⇒ x*↓
Wider Recognition of the System q↑ ⇒ x*↑
x*( p
＋
, q
＋
, r
＋
, s
＋
, n
－
, į－)
p: Need for Care Rate, q: Application Rate, r: Certification Rate, s: Net User Rate,
n: Gross Growth Rate of Insured Individuals, į: Depreciation Rate
Figure 3.3　Transitional Paths of User Rates: Numerical Example
{x(a, 0) = 0.1, x(b, 0) = 0.15, p = 0.25, q = 0.8, r = 0.15, s = 0.8, n = 0.1, į = 0.05, x(a, 0) = 0.1, x(b, 0) = 0.15}
Panel A Panel B
－ 46 －
　Panel A of figure 3.4 depicts the effects of a change in parameter value on the transitional path of user 
rates. For periods t =  0, 1, 2, ... , 10, we assume the same assumptions as before, i.e., {p = 0.25, q = 0.8, r 
= 0.15, s = 0.8, n = 0.1, į = 0.05} and {x(a, 0) = 0.1, x(b, 0) = 0.15}, hence x* = 0.2052. We also assume 
that at t = 11 the application rate q increases from 0.8 to 0.9 and stays at the higher value thereafter which 
implies the new steady state x* = 0.2817. Panel A of figure 3.4 shows that the transitional paths, at the time 
of shock t = 11, begin to converge to the new and higher steady state. As depicted by panel B of figure 3.4, 
the change causes a temporary increase in growth rates of both regions.
Figure 3.4　Transitional Paths of User Rates (Shock at t = 10): Numerical Example
Panel A Panel B
{x(a, 0) = 0.1, x(b, 0) = 0.15, p = 0.25, r = 0.15, s = 0.8, n = 0.1, į = 0.05, x(a, 0) = 0.1, x(b, 0)= 0.15}
{q = 0.8, t = 0, 1, 2, ... , 10}, {q = 0.9, t = 11, 12, ... }
3. 3　Data Properties
　In this section, we look at the data of public long-term care insurance system for the properties of 
average user rate and regional differences. For the analyses, we use the data provided by the Japan Ministry 
of Health, Labor, and Welfare. There are cautions on interpreting the data. See appendix at the end of paper 
for details.
　In figure 3.5, panel A depicts the graph of average user rate of 47 Japanese regions (prefectures), and 
panel B depicts the graph of growth rate of average user rate. These graphs show that the average user rate 
increased between 2000 and 2005 at diminishing growth rate. After the temporal decline in 2006 and 2007, 
the average user rate began to grow again, but at diminishing growth rate. There seems to be a structural 
change before and after the 2005 reform. Figure 3.6 is the graph of coefficient of variation of the regional 
user rates, and figure 3.7 is the graph of max÷min ratio of the regional user rates. The coefficient of 
variation slightly increased between 2000 and 2005. After 2006, it did not show clear trend. The max÷
min ratio, on the other hand, showed declining trend throughout the data periods. (The spikes in figure 3.6 
and figure 3.7 are caused by irregular movement in Niigata's user rate which plummeted in one and only 
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one year 2007.) Figure 3.8 depicts the graph of Gini coefficient of the regional user rates. Like figure 3.7 
which depicts the graph of max÷min ratio, the Gini coefficient showed declining trend throughout the data 
periods, suggesting the diminishing regional differences in user rates.
Panel A Panel B
Figure 3.5　Average User Rate of 47 Japanese Prefectures
Data Source: Japan Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
Figure 3.6　Coefficient of Variation of Regional User Rates
Data Source: Japan Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
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　Next, in order to analyze the variations in the standing order (high and low) of regional user rates, we 
sorted the 47 regions (prefectures) according to each region's user rate, and divided them into 5 groups {Ⅰ (7 
regions), Ⅱ (10), Ⅲ (10), Ⅳ (10), Ⅴ (10)}. GroupⅠ consist of 7 regions with the highest user rates, group
Ⅱ consists of 10 regions with second highest user rates, and so on. GroupⅤ consists of 10 regions with 
the lowest user rates. Then, for 2000-2012, we calculated the mean user rate and the annual rate of change 
Figure 3.7　Max÷Min Ratio of Regional User Rates
Data Source: Japan Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
Figure 3.8　Gini Coefficient of Regional User Rates
Data Source: Japan Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
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for each group. The results are summarized in table 3.2. The table reveals the following properties;
（ⅰ）The movement of each group's use rate resembles the movement of the average user rate. That is, 
they grew but at diminishing rate between 2000 and 2005, declined temporarily in 2006 and 2007, then 
started to grow again after 2008 at diminishing rate. There seems to be a structural change before and after 
the 2005 reform.
（ⅱ）In the first half (2000-2005),the years before the 2005 reform, the higher (lower) is a group's user 
rate, the slower (faster) is the subsequent growth of the group's user rate, i.e., the regional user rates seem 
to converge. For example, in 2000, groupⅠ's user rate is 2.43 and groupⅤ's use rate is 1.62. Between 2000 
and 2001, the rate of change in groupⅠ's user rate is 0.27 while that of groupⅤ is 0.31. Between 2000 and 
2005, the average annual growth rates are higher (lower) for the groups with lower (higher) user rate. Such 
a convergence in regional user rates is not so obvious in the second half (2006-2012), the years after the 
2005 reform, although it seems to hold for the groups with higher user rates. In figure 3.9, panel A depicts 
the graphs of groupⅠ's user rate and groupⅤ's user rate, and panel B depicts the graphs of growth rate of 
groupⅠ's user rate and that of groupⅤ's user rate. Compare and notice the resemblance between figure 
3.9 (actual data) and figure 3.4 (calibrated data). The comparison of these figures seems to suggest that the 
convergent paths of user rates were affected by the 2005 reform. The 2005 reform might have altered the 
steady state, and initiated convergence to the new steady state.
Table 3.2　Regional User Rates of Groups {Ⅰ , Ⅱ , Ⅲ , Ⅳ , Ⅴ }
Regional User Rates
GroupⅠ GroupⅡ GroupⅢ GroupⅣ GroupⅤ
2000 2.428 2.180 1.971 1.841 1.619
2001 3.075 2.789 2.560 2.394 2.120
2002 3.499 3.214 2.988 2.769 2.471
2003 3.891 3.597 3.333 3.096 2.783
2004 4.193 3.879 3.571 3.356 3.024
2005 4.348 4.024 3.714 3.493 3.138
2006 4.262 3.910 3.662 3.437 3.098
2007 4.229 3.871 3.626 3.411 2.966
2008 4.321 3.955 3.724 3.518 3.138
2009 4.441 4.087 3.841 3.638 3.227
2010 4.618 4.296 4.055 3.830 3.395
2011 4.779 4.444 4.190 3.938 3.514
2012 4.873 4.521 4.289 4.061 3.590
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　Although the regional user rates seem to exhibit a convergence property, it might not be an unconditional 
convergence. As we saw in the theoretical model analysis of the user rate, if each region has different 
parameter values, then each region's user rate may converge to region-specific steady state. If the 
convergence is conditional on region-specific elements, then the standing order (high and low) of regional 
Growth Rate of Regional User Rates
GroupⅠ GroupⅡ GroupⅢ GroupⅣ GroupⅤ
2000
2001 0.267 0.279 0.299 0.300 0.310
2002 0.138 0.152 0.167 0.157 0.165
2003 0.112 0.119 0.115 0.118 0.126
2004 0.077 0.079 0.071 0.084 0.087
2005 0.037 0.037 0.040 0.041 0.038
2006 -0.020 -0.028 -0.014 -0.016 -0.013
2007 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.042
2008 0.022 0.022 0.027 0.031 0.058
2009 0.028 0.033 0.031 0.034 0.028
2010 0.040 0.051 0.056 0.053 0.052
2011 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.028 0.035
2012 0.020 0.017 0.023 0.031 0.022
Data Source: Japan Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
Figure 3.9　User Rates of GroupⅠ and GroupⅤ
Panel A　User Rates Panel B　Growth Rates of User Rates
Data Source: Japan Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
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user rates may not be variable. In fact, as shown in table 3.3, which is a list of 5 regions (prefectures) with 
the higher user rates and 5 regions with the lowest between 2000 and 2012, there was a small degree of 
variation in the standing order. For example, Wakayama, Tokushima, and Hiroshima belonged to the top 5 
regions for all but 3 years between 2000-2012. Especially, Wakayama had the highest user rate in 2003 and 
2005, and for all the years in the second half (2006-2012). On the other hand, Tochigi, Ibaraki, Chiba, and 
Saitama, all of them are located in Kanto area, belonged to the bottom 5 regions for all the sample years.
Table 3.3　Regional User Rates: The Highest 5 Regions and the Lowest 5 Regions
STANDING 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1 Kagoshima Kagoshima Kagoshima Wakayama Tokushima Wakayama
2 Aomori Aomori Kyoto Kagoshima Wakayama Tokushima
3 Oita Okinawa Okinawa Tokushima Hiroshima Hiroshima
4 Okinawa Hiroshima Hiroshima Hiroshima Oita Oita
5 Hiroshima Kyoto Aomori Kyoto Kyoto Nagasaki
43 Yamanashi Yamanashi Yamanashi Hokkaido Hokkaido Hokkaido
44 Tochigi Tochigi Tochigi Tochigi Tochigi Tochigi
45 Ibaraki Chiba Chiba Chiba Chiba Chiba
46 Chiba Saitama Saitama Saitama Saitama Saitama
47 Saitama Ibaraki Ibaraki Ibaraki Ibaraki Ibaraki
STANDING 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1 Wakayama Wakayama Wakayama Wakayama Wakayama Wakayama Wakayama
2 Tokushima Tokushima Tokushima Tokushima Tokushima Tokushima Osaka
3 Hiroshima Hiroshima Shimane Nagasaki Nagasaki Osaka Tokushima
4 Aomori Aomori Hiroshima Shimane Hiroshima Nagasaki Shimane
5 Ehime Ehime Ehime Ehime Shimane Shimane Nagasaki
43 Hokkaido Tochigi Aichi Aichi Aichi Shizuoka Shizuoka
44 Tochigi Chiba Tochigi Tochigi Tochigi Tochigi Tochigi
45 Chiba Ibaraki Chiba Chiba Chiba Chiba Chiba
46 Saitama Saitama Ibaraki Ibaraki Ibaraki Saitama Saitama
47 Ibaraki Niigata Saitama Saitama Saitama Ibaraki Ibaraki
Data Source: Japan Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
　Despite the small variation in the standing order of regional user rates, the 2005 reform might have 
affected each region's mobility across the ladder of standing order because its objective is to remedy the 
regional differences. Therefore, if the reform had the implied effects, if any, we could expect the increased 
mobility of the standing order in the second half (2006-2012) relative to the first half (2000-2005). The 
objective of the next section, hence, is to evaluate if the 2005 reform did remedy the regional differences 
and alleviated the standing order inertia.
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4．Mobility Analyses of Regional User Rates'Standing Order
　In this section, we develop an index for measuring the degree of regions' mobility across the ladder of 
user rates standing order (high and low) to see if the 2005 reform had the implied effects. The index, which 
is based on Markov transition matrixes, is calculated by the following 4 steps.
Step 1: Let {x(i, t); i = 1, 2, ... , 47, t = 2000, 2001, ... , 2012} stands for the user rate of region i in year t. 
For each year t, {x(i, t); i = 1, 2, ... , 47} is sorted from the highest to the lowest, and divided into 5 groups 
{Ⅰ (7 regions), Ⅱ (10), Ⅲ (10), Ⅳ (10), Ⅴ (10)} as we did in section 3.3.
Step 2: We construct a Markov transition matrix of size 5×5 from 2000 to 2001, denoted as P0, 1, as 
follows. The (1, 1) element of the matrix, denoted as P0, 1(1, 1), is the number of regions of groupⅠ in 2000 
that remained in groupⅠ in the next year 2001 divided by the group size (7 regions). For example, among 
seven regions of groupⅠ in 2000, if two regions move to the other groups while five regions stay, then 
P0, 1(1, 1) = 5/7. The other elements {P0, 1(1, j); j = 2, 3, 4, 5} of the first row of P0, 1 imply the number of 
regions of groupⅠ in 2000 that moved to group j in 2001 divided by groupⅠ's size. Generally, we denote 
{Pt, t + 1(i, j); i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, t = 2000, 2001, ... , 2011} as the number of regions of group i in year t that 
moved to group j in year t + 1 divided by group i 's size.
Step 3. We calculate the average Markov transition matrixes for the first half by:
　　 1/5
 （4.1）
and for the second half by
　　
1/7
 （4.2）
The average Markov transition matrixes {PA, PB} have the following properties.
（ⅰ）By construction, the five elements of each row of Pt, t + 1 add up to one, i.e.,
　　 Pt, t + 1(i, j) = 1 for all i∈{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and for all t∈{2000, 2001, ... , 2011}. （4.3）
By definition, the same property also holds for the average Markov transition matrixes {PA, PB}. This 
implies that {PA, PB} are probability matrixes.
（ⅱ）For k = 1, 2, 3, ... , the k-th powered average Markov transition Matrixes {(PA)k, (PB)k; k = 1, 2, 3, 
... } are also probability matrixes. We use the average Markov transition matrixes to evaluate the degree of 
variation in the standing order of regional user rates as follows. Suppose, although counter factual, there 
was no variation in the standing order of regional user rates in the first half, i.e., no region moved from one 
group to the others in any years between 2000 and 2005. Then, each Markov transition matrix {Pt, t + 1; t = 
2000, 2001, ... , 2004} is a 5×5 unit matrix, so are the average matrix PA and its k-th power {(PA)k; k = 1, 
2, 3, ... }. On the other hand, if there are regions that moved from one group to the others in the first half, 
then some of the Markov transition matrixes have non-zero non-diagonal elements, so does the average 
matrix PA. In this case, each row of the k-th powered average Markov transition Matrix (PA)k may converge 
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to the “uniform” distribution {7/47, 10/47, 10/47, 10/47, 10/47} as k becomes larger. For example, the first 
row of (PA)k, denoted as {(PA)k(1, j); j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, expresses the hypothetical probability distribution for 
a region in group I's whereabouts among 5 groups k years later if the degree of variation in the first half 
continues. Then, the convergence of the first row to the “uniform” distribution implies that, even if the 
degree of variation in the standing order of regional user rates is small in the short run, it will be variable in 
the long run. In which group a region will be in the long run is a random event described by the “uniform” 
distribution.
Step 4: The degree of variation in the long run, may be different in the first half and the second half because 
of the 2005 reform which aimed to remedy the regional differences in user rates. To compare the degree 
of variation before and after the 2005 reform, we calculated the distances between each row of the k-th 
powered average Markov transition matrixes {(PA)k, (PB)k; k = 1, 2, 3, ... } and the “uniform” distribution as 
follows. For {k = 1, 2, 3, ... , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
　　
10/47
1 27/47 10/47
5
 
（4.4）
　　
1 27/47 10/47
10/475
 
（4.5）
For example, VA(k, 1) is a distance between the first row of the k-th powered average Markov transition 
matrixes (PA)k and the “uniform” distribution {7/47, 10/47, 10/47, 10/47, 10/47}. Then, the standing order 
convergence of regional user rates in the first half and that in the second half may be defined as follows.
　　 0 1 2 3 4 5  （4.6）
　　 1 2 3 4 50  （4.7）
We expect the quicker convergence in the second half than the first half if the 2005 reform had the implied 
effects.
　By using the MHLW data, the average Markov transition matrixes of the first half and the second half 
are calculated as follows.
 （4.8）
　　
 （4.9）
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For example, the first row of PA implies that, on average between 2000 and 2005, for a region in groupⅠ, 
the probability of staying in groupⅠ after one year is 0.81, the probability of moving to groupⅡ is 0.19, 
and the probability of moving to any other groups (Ⅲ , Ⅳ , or Ⅴ ) is zero. The squared average Markov 
transition matrix of the first half is calculated as follows.
 （4. 10）
　　
The first row of (PA)2 implies that, under the degree of standing order mobility in the first half, for a region 
in groupⅠ, the probability of staying in groupⅠ after two years is 0.681, the probability of moving to 
groupⅡ is 0.294, the probability of moving to groupⅢ is 0.025, and the probability of moving to group
Ⅳ or groupⅤ is zero. The six panels of figure 4.1 show the first row of (PA)k for k = 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, and 100. 
Although a region in groupⅠ tends to stay in groupⅠ for a short period of time, it may move to the other 
groups in the long run, and the probability distribution of being in groupsⅠíⅤ seems to converge to the 
Figure 4.1　The First Row of (PA)k for k = 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, and 100.
Panel 1　　PA Panel 4　　(PA)5
Panel 2　　(PA)2 Panel 5　　(PA)10
Panel 3　　(PA)3 Panel 6　　(PA)100
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“uniform” distribution {7/47, 10/47, 10/47, 10/47, 10/47}.
　The five panels of figure 4.2 show the graphs of {VA(k, i), VB(k, i); k = 1, 2, 3, ... , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. 
For example, panel 1 shows the graph of the distance VA(k, 1) between the first row of average Markov 
transition matrix {(PA)k(1, j); k = 1, 2, 3, ... , j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and the “uniform” distribution {7/47, 10/47, 
10/47, 10/47, 10/47} for the first half {2000, 2001, ... , 2005} and the graph of VB(k, 1) for the second half 
{2006, 2007, ... , 2012} such that the horizontal axis measures the power {k = 1, 2, 3, ... } and the vertical 
axis measures {VA(k, 1), VB(k, 1)}. We may infer the following properties of figure 4.2.
（ⅰ）For the groups of regions with higher user rates (such as groupⅠ and groupⅡ ), the speed of 
convergence to the “uniform” distribution is faster in the first half than the second half. There is not 
much difference in the speed of convergence for groupⅢ . On the other hand, for the groups of regions 
with lower user rates (such as groupⅣ and groupⅤ ), the order seems to be reversed, i.e., the speed of 
convergence is quicker in the second half than the first half.
Figure 4.2　The Graphs of {VA(k, i ), VB(k, i ); k = 1, 2, 3, ... , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
Panel 1
Panel 2
Panel 3
Panel 4
Panel 5
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（ⅱ）Both in the first half and in the second half, the speed of convergence is slower for the groups of 
regions with higher user rates and for the groups of regions with lower user rates, and faster for the groups 
of regions with intermediate user rates.
（ⅲ）In the first half, groupⅤ's speed of convergence is the slowest. It would take 7 years to close the 
distance by less than half, i.e., VA(1, 5) = 0.6533 and VA(7, 5) = 0.2961＜VA(1, 5)/2. For the other groups, it 
would take 3 - 4 years to close the distance by less than half.
（ⅳ）In the second half, groupⅠ's speed of convergence is the slowest. It would take 16 years to close the 
distance by less than half, i.e., VB(1, 1) = 0.8559 and VB(16, 1) = 0.4159＜VB(1, 1)/2. For the other groups, 
it would take 3 - 6 years to close the distance by less than half.
　If the problems of public long-term care insurance system that originate from regional differences are 
more serious in regions with higher user rates, then the 2005 reform does not seem to be effective because 
the standing order mobility, measured by {VA(k, i), VB(k, i); k = 1, 2, 3, ... , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, did not improve 
after the reform. The above analyses seem to suggest that the standing order convergence is conditional 
because there seem to remain persistent regional differences even after the 2005 reform. Each region's user 
rate may be converging to region-specific steady state, and the standing order of regional user rates may 
exhibit small variation for the long periods of time. On the other hand, if we are able to remove region-
specific factors from the data, then the residual user rates may converge to the same steady state, and 
the standing order of residual user rates may be more variable. This is what we will try to do in the next 
section.
5．Mobility Analyses of Standing Order based on Residual User Rates
　As we saw in the previous section, the standing order (high and low) of regional user rates did not 
seem to become variable after the 2005 reform which had aimed to alleviate the immobility. As table 
3.3 suggests, some regions in groupⅠ (consisting of regions with the highest user rates) or groupⅤ 
(consisting of regions with the lowest user rates) do not seem to move to the other groups. Preceding 
researches suggest that the user rate convergence may be conditional, i.e., each region's user rate may 
converge to region-specific steady state if each region has different parameter values. Hence, if we are 
able to remove region-specific elements that cause the differences in regional user rates, the remaining 
(residual) use rates may converge to a common steady state. Therefore, we regress each region's user rate 
on the variables that might explain the regional differences, and use the regression residuals to recalculate 
the speed of convergence to the “uniform” distribution. If the explanatory variables are able to account for 
the regional differences in user rates, then the speed of convergence of residual user rates will be improved. 
As a preliminary attempt, we looked at preceding researches and chose the following three explanatory 
variables; For region (prefecture) i = 1, 2, ... , 47, and for year t = 2000, 2001, ... , 2012, h1(i, t) is the 
certification rate which may represent each region's administrative discipline, h2(i, t) is the late-stage (75 
years or older) old age population rate, and h3(i, t) is the ordinary balance rate which may represent the 
region's fiscal flexibility and robustness. (These data are available from the MHLW and the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications.) For each t = 2000, 2001, ... , 2012, we estimate the following model.
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　　 1 2 47
 
（5.1）
In (5.1), x(i, t) is the user rate. After obtaining the OLS estimates of regression parameters {a0, a1, a2. a3}, 
we use the (exponent of) regression residuals {e(i, t); i = 1, 2, ... , 47, t = 2000, 2001, ... , 2012} to calculate 
the speed of convergence before and after the 2005 reform as we had done in the previous section. Table 
5.1 summarizes the regression results. The fitting of the statistical model (5.1) to the data is not so good. 
Although the three variables {h1, h2, h3} together explain 70 - 80% of the variation in the user rate x, the 
only significant variable is the certification rate h1. The ordinary balance rate h2 is marginally significant. 
The late-stage old age population rate h2 is insignificant.
Table 5.1　OLS Estimates of Equation (5.1)
Intercept h1(i, t) h2(i, t) h3(i, t) Adjusted R2
2000 2.975 0.875 0.129 0.077 0.827
(t Value) 11.613 11.891 1.898 2.013
2001 2.974 0.881 0.065 0.066 0.803
(t Value) 12.038 11.744 0.981 1.788
2002 2.892 0.858 0.034 0.057 0.795
(t Value) 12.531 11.987 0.524 1.612
2003 3.036 0.862 0.071 0.068 0.776
(t Value) 12.041 11.560 0.919 1.690
2004 3.088 0.919 0.030 0.069 0.791
(t Value) 14.198 12.282 0.451 2.021
2005 3.167 0.956 0.028 0.081 0.784
(t Value) 14.792 12.042 0.421 2.327
Intercept h1(i, t) h2(i, t) h3(i, t) Adjusted R2
2006 3.051 0.934 0.006 0.065 0.755
(t Value) 14.101 10.747 0.094 1.823
2007 2.792 1.011 -0.148 0.023 0.452
(t Value) 7.005 5.900 -1.118 0.358
2008 2.984 0.948 -0.031 0.053 0.718
(t Value) 13.392 9.423 -0.397 1.504
2009 3.038 0.967 -0.031 0.060 0.730
(t Value) 13.582 9.595 -0.383 1.652
2010 3.039 0.954 -0.029 0.062 0.734
(t Value) 13.461 9.820 -0.363 1.653
2011 3.078 0.988 -0.046 0.068 0.747
(t Value) 13.158 10.242 -0.548 1.711
2012 3.028 0.985 -0.066 0.055 0.743
(t Value) 12.950 10.085 -0.764 1.405
h1(i, t): certification rate
h2(i, t): late-stage (75 years or older) old age population rate
h3(i, t): ordinary balance rate
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　We used the regression residuals to calculate average Markov transition matrixes, denoted as PAR for the 
first half {2000, 2001, ... , 2005} and PBR for the second half {2006, 2007, ... , 2012}. Then we used {(PAR)k, 
(PBR)k; k = 1, 2, ... } to calculate the distances, denoted as {VAR(k, i), VBR(k, i); k = 1, 2, 3, ... , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5}, from the “uniform” distribution {7/47, 10/47, 10/47, 10/47, 10/47} for the first half and the second half. 
The five panels of figure 5.1 show the graphs of {VAR(k, i), VBR(k, i); k = 1, 2, 3, ... , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Even 
after adjusted for the region-specific factors, like {VA(k, i), VB(k, i)} for the unadjusted user rates shown in 
figure 4.2, the speed of convergence of groupⅠ VAR(k, i) is faster in the first half than the second half VBR(k, i), 
while the order is reversed for groupⅤ .
Figure 5.1　The Graphs of {VAR(k, i ), VBR(k, i ); k = 1, 2, 3, ... , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
Panel 3
Panel 1 Panel 4
Panel 2 Panel 5
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　The five panels of figure 5.2 plot and compare the adjusted distance for the first half VAR(k, i) and the 
unadjusted distance VA(k, i) for the first half. Similarly, the five panels of figure 5.3 plot and compare the 
adjusted distance for the second half VBR(k, i) and the unadjusted distance VB(k, i) for the second half. These 
figures show that for the first half and the second half, and for all the 5 groups, the speed of convergence 
is faster after adjusted for the region-specific factors. This implies that the convergence might have been 
conditional, i.e., each region's user rate, if unadjusted for region-specific factors, is converging to region-
specific steady state user rate.
Panel 5
Panel 1 Panel 4
Panel 2 Panel 5
Figure 5.2　The Graphs of {VA(k, i ), VAR(k, i ); k = 1, 2, 3, ... , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
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Figure 5.3　The Graphs of {VB(k, i ), VBR(k, i ); k = 1, 2, 3, ... , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
Panel 3
Panel 1 Panel 4
Panel 2 Panel 5
　It turned out as well, however, that the standing order of regional user rates, even after being adjusted 
for region-specific factors, is not quite variable yet. Table 5.2 shows the 5 regions with the highest residual 
user rates and the 5 regions with the lowest residual user rates between 2000 and 2012. The table shows 
that some regions still hardly change their positions in the standing order. For example, Hokkaido stays the 
47th for all the sample years but 2007, while Nagano stays the first for all but two years. These observations 
suggest that there are factors other than the ones we chose (the certification rate, the late-stage old age 
population rate, and the ordinary balance rate) that cause the regional differences in user rates.
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6．Conclusion
　In this research, we analyzed the dynamic properties of the regional differences in user rates defined as 
the ratio of long-term care service users relative to the primary insured individuals (65 years or older). This 
is a preliminary research. The followings are some of the issues yet to be addressed.
（ⅰ）Find factors that account for the differences in regional figures
（ⅱ）In this research, we analyzed the regional differences among prefectures. The difference, however, 
may be wider and more prominent among less aggregated levels such as villages, towns, and cities. 
For example, in each prefecture, the behavior of covered individuals and insurers (municipalities) at 
countryside may be very different from that of urbane area. Therefore, it might be desirable to employ 
detailed case studies to supplement the approach employed in this research.
（ⅲ）The theoretical model of section 2 does not have detailed structure of the market for long-term care 
services. For a better understanding of the market, it is desirable to enrich the model by incorporating such 
elements as demand, supply, prices, taxes, and subsidies.
Table 5.2　Regional User Rates (Regression Residuals): The Highest 5 Regions and the Lowest 5 Regions
STANDING 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1 Shiga Nagano Nagano Nagano Nagano Nagano
2 Aomori Shiga Shiga Kyoto Wakayama Wakayama
3 Nagano Aomori Kyoto Shiga Kyoto Shiga
4 Gifu Gifu Yamagata Wakayama Shiga Kyoto
5 Kanagawa Yamagata Niigata Niigata Yamagata Niigata
43 Fukuoka Fukuoka Osaka Toyama Mie Ishikawa
44 Kochi Yamaguchi Akita Yamaguchi Yamaguchi Yamaguchi
45 Yamaguchi Kochi Yamaguchi Osaka Akita Akita
46 Akita Akita Kochi Kochi Kochi Kochi
47 Hokkaido Hokkaido Hokkaido Hokkaido Hokkaido Hokkaido
STANDING 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1 Wakayama Nagano Nagano Nagano Nagano Nagano Nagano
2 Nagano Wakayama Wakayama Wakayama Shiga Shiga Aomori
3 Shiga Yamagata Shiga Shiga Aomori Aomori Shiga
4 Kyoto Shiga Aomori Aomori Wakayama Yamanashi Wakayama
5 Yamagata Aomori Kyoto Yamanashi Yamanashi Wakayama Yamanashi
43 Ishikawa Nagasaki Okayama Kagoshima Kagoshima Kagoshima Kagoshima
44 Mie Okinawa Ibaraki Ibaraki Ibaraki Ibaraki Yamaguchi
45 Yamaguchi Hokkaido Yamaguchi Yamaguchi Yamaguchi Yamaguchi Ibaraki
46 Kochi Kochi Kochi Kochi Kochi Kochi Kochi
47 Hokkaido Niigata Hokkaido Hokkaido Hokkaido Hokkaido Hokkaido
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Appendix. Data Sources and Its Properties.
　For the analyses in this research, we used the data provided by the Japan Ministry of Health, Labor, and 
Welfare. [The Reports on Long-term Care Insurance System: Annual Reports, 2000 - 2012 Fiscal Years 
(URL http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/kaigo/joukyou.html)] There are some cautions on using the data;
（ⅰ）The public long-term care insurance system started on April 2000. Therefore, the data for 2000 fiscal 
year consists of 11 months, from April 2000 to February 2001. The data for each fiscal year between 2001 
and 2012 consists of 12 months, from March of the year to the February of the next year.
（ⅱ）In accordance with the 2005 reform, community-based services started on April 2006. The total 
number of long-term care services in each fiscal year between 2000 and 2005 and March 2006 is the sum 
of in-home services and facility services. On the other hand, the total number of services after April 2006 
includes community-based services in addition to the formerly provided services.
（ⅲ）We analyzed the data of primary insured individuals (65 years or older). The data of secondary 
insured individuals (40 - 64 years old) are excluded.
（ⅳ）Because each primary insured individual may use in-home services, facility services, and 
community-based services many times in a year, the user rate, defined as the total number of services used 
by primary insured individuals divided by the number of primary insured individuals, may exceeds one. In 
the theoretical model of section 3, the user rate xt≡Xt /Lt is defined as the ratio of the number of insured 
individuals who use services Xt to the number of insured individuals Lt. An insured individual is included 
in Xt if she uses at least one service. Xt does not reflect the number of services each insured individual uses. 
This implies 0 ≦xt≦ 1 in the theoretical model. Therefore, we implicitly assume that if the theoretical 
model is true so that the user rate xt converges to the steady state x*, the same force also works on the user 
rate calculated from the data in the manner stated above.
　Because of the discontinuity, we looked at two series. Series [ALL] includes all the services, while 
series [EXC] excludes the community-based services from the second half data. Table A1 reports the basic 
statistics of regional user rates [ALL]; mean, annual rate of change, variance, coefficient of variation, 
maximum value, minimum value, and max?min ratio. Table A1 also reports the basic statistics of regional 
user rates [EXC].
Table A1　Regional User Rates with and without Community-Based Services
Mean [ALL] GrowthRate [ALL] Variance [ALL] Coeff.Var [ALL] Max [ALL] Min [ALL] Max/Min [ALL]
2000 1.9812 0.0809 0.0408 2.7487 1.4134 1.9448
2001 2.5566 0.2904 0.1103 0.0431 3.3282 1.8398 1.8090
2002 2.9556 0.1561 0.1301 0.0440 3.7131 2.1468 1.7296
2003 3.3046 0.1181 0.1519 0.0460 4.0299 2.4232 1.6630
2004 3.5668 0.0794 0.1706 0.0478 4.4533 2.6575 1.6757
2005 3.7049 0.0387 0.1839 0.0496 4.7039 2.8077 1.6754
2006 3.6365 -0.0185 0.1647 0.0453 4.6696 2.8181 1.6570
2007 3.5820 -0.0150 0.2127 0.0594 4.6814 1.9558 2.3936
2008 3.6935 0.0311 0.1674 0.0453 4.8177 2.8299 1.7024
2009 3.8090 0.0313 0.1783 0.0468 4.9431 2.8929 1.7087
2010 4.0018 0.0506 0.1831 0.0457 4.9355 3.0319 1.6279
2011 4.1344 0.0331 0.1979 0.0479 5.1233 3.1104 1.6472
2012 4.2280 0.0226 0.1991 0.0471 5.2352 3.1706 1.6512
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Mean [EXC] GrowthRate [EXC] Variance [EXC] Coeff.Var [EXC] Max [EXC] Min [EXC] Max/Min [EXC]
2000 1.9812 0.0809 0.0408 2.7487 1.4134 1.9448
2001 2.5566 0.2904 0.1103 0.0431 3.3282 1.8398 1.8090
2002 2.9556 0.1561 0.1301 0.0440 3.7131 2.1468 1.7296
2003 3.3046 0.1181 0.1519 0.0460 4.0299 2.4232 1.6630
2004 3.5668 0.0794 0.1706 0.0478 4.4533 2.6575 1.6757
2005 3.7049 0.0387 0.1839 0.0496 4.7039 2.8077 1.6754
2006 3.6365 -0.0185 0.1647 0.0453 4.6696 2.8181 1.6570
2007 3.5820 -0.0150 0.2127 0.0594 4.6814 1.9558 2.3936
2008 3.6935 0.0311 0.1674 0.0453 4.8177 2.8299 1.7024
2009 3.8090 0.0313 0.1783 0.0468 4.9431 2.8929 1.7087
2010 4.0018 0.0506 0.1831 0.0457 4.9355 3.0319 1.6279
2011 4.1344 0.0331 0.1979 0.0479 5.1233 3.1104 1.6472
2012 4.2280 0.0226 0.1991 0.0471 5.2352 3.1706 1.6512
　Panel 1 of figure A1 depicts the graph of average user rate [ALL] and the graph of [EXC]. Because of 
the introduction of community-based services in the second half, the average user rate [ALL] is higher 
than [EXC] in the second half. Despite the inclusion of community-based services, these graphs show the 
similar movements. Between 2000 and 2005, the average user rate increased, but at diminishing growth 
rate. After the temporary decline in 2006 and 2007, the average user rate began to increase again. The speed 
of the growth diminished for the last two years, 2011 and 2012. We can reconfirm these properties in panel 
2 of figure A1 which depicts the growth rate of the user rate [ALL] and that of [EXC]. Since both user rates 
[ALL] and [EXC] show similar movements, in this research we focus on the analyses of user rate [ALL] 
that includes the community-based services in the second half.
[ALL] Includes Community-Based Services. [EXC] Community-Based Services Excluded.
Data Source: Japan Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
Figure A1　Regional User Rates with and without Community-Based Services
Data Source: Japan Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
Panel A　User Rates Panel B　Growth Rates of User Rates
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